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INTRODUCTION
Comes now Defendants/Appellants pursuant to Rule 24(c) and
offer the following reply and clarification to certain issues
raised by Plaintiff/Appellee's brief.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE ENTIRE RECORD DEMONSTRATES THAT THE TRIAL
COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE CASE
AND DENYING THE DEFENDANTS1 MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

Plaintiff's counsel, as a strong advocate for her client,
focuses solely upon the number of days between Plaintiff's first
request of discovery to the date of the default judgment.
However, in emphasizing only the time frame, Plaintiff's counsel
fails to recognize significant events that took place during the
intern time frame.
To begin with, Defendants in good faith answered thirty-five
(35) of the thirty-nine (39) interrogatories, sixty-nine (69)
days before the trial court entered default judgment.

See the

Defendants1 brief page 4 and 5.
Moreover, the Plaintiff ignores the discovery obtained in
the Bennett v. Craqhead almost three hundred (300) days before
Plaintiff sought discovery in the present case.
Appendix B.

See Defendants'

The discovery Plaintiff sought in the present case

was very duplicative of the discovery they had already obtained
in the Bennett case.

Therefore, any lack of discovery in the

present case has caused little, if any, prejudice upon the
Plaintiff.
Plaintiff also fails to admit that it took themselves one
hundred six days (106) days to clarify their requests for

1

documents and the four (4) objectionable interrogatories.

Such

clarification did not occur until July 8, 1994, during deposition
of Mr. Padan. (Defendants Appendix C-8 pages 3-6).
Plaintiff's efforts to characterize Defendants as
individuals willfully refusing to comply with discovery requests
is simply unfounded in the facts as set forth in the record.

On

June 17, 1994, the Defendants filed what they considered good
faith and complete answers to the interrogatories and asked for
clarifications on the types of documents sought by the Plaintiff.
See Appendix C of the Appellants' brief.

It was not until July 8

of Mr. Padan's deposition that the Plaintiff clarified documents
they sought and narrowed the remaining four (4) of the thirtynine (39) interrogatories.

At that time both parties agreed that

the documents should be provided by July 15, 1994. See
Appellants' brief page 7.

Five (5) days later the Defendant

Padan's office was burglarized.
As an example of Plaintiff's counsel's continual failure to
recognize all the facts of the case, Defendants refer this Court
to the Affidavit of Ms. Jennifer Falk dated 19th of August, 1994.
This Affidavit was in support of the Plaintiff's Motion for Entry
of Judgment.

In the Affidavit Plaintiff's counsel simply states:

I have received no documents from Defendants since
the entry of the court's ruling of July 27, 1994.
I have not received any discovery whatsoever,
including answers to interrogatories from Defendants
since the date of the court's ruling.
More than twenty days have passed since the date
of the court's ruling of July 27, 1995.
Nowhere in the affidavit does Plaintiff's counsel mention
the July 8 Padan deposition, the July 13 burglary, or the
2

numerous messages left her by Defendant Padan and Defendant's
counsel.

This Affidavit demonstrates how the Plaintiff focuses

on certain facts but ignores significant other facts.
Neither in the above described Affidavit nor in Plaintiff's
Brief does Plaintiff address the fact that both the Defendant
Padan and Defendants' counsel left several messages with
Plaintiff's counsel disclosing the burglary and asking for a
return phone call to work out contingencies.

Plaintiff's counsel

fails to mention that she did not return any such phone calls or
seek an explanation from the Defendants as to why discovery had
not been made.

In fact, it was not until August 4, 1994, the

date the court entered an order and judgment against the
Defendants, that the Plaintiff's counsel first responded to the
numerous messages left by the Defendant and Defendants' counsel.
The letter dated August 8, 1994, which is included in Defendants'
Appendix E illustrates the extent to which Plaintiff's counsel
went

in an effort to stay ignorant of the facts to utilize the

lack of knowledge of the burglary of the Defendant Padan's office
to her client's benefit.
The letter reads in part as follows:
I have attempted to contact you during the last three
weeks leaving various phone message with your personal
secretary, most recently on August 4, as well as with
the receptionist of Winder and Haslam. The purpose of
my attempts to contact you, as well as Mr. Padan's
separate attempts, was to inform you that Mr. Padan's
business was burglarized on July 13, 1994. Rather than
giving me the courtesy of returning my phone calls, you
have proceeded to pursue your motion for sanctions.
Rather than talk to me directly you have responded by
letter which was faxed to my office on August 4, 1994.
Perhaps you feel justified in maintaining an
intentional ignorance of the events, however I believe
your actions are not justifiable.

3

Plaintiff's counsel should not be allowed to intentionally
stay ignorant of the circumstances concerning discovery to this
court.

Defendants merely ask this court to review the

Plaintiff's recitation of the total course of proceedings and
determine if based upon the total circumstances, the Defendants
have willfully abused the discovery process warranting the entry
of the Default Judgment as sanctions.
II.

IMPOSSIBILITY OF PROVIDING DOCUMENTS AFTER THE BURGLARY

Plaintiff's Brief raises two issues concerning the
Defendants' ability to provide certain information after the
Burglary.

The Defendants now seek to clarify.

The first question concerns the ability of Mr. Craghead to
produce documents after the burglary.

Mr. Padan, being the

general contractor and operator of Aspen Construction, retained
all business records at his office mostly on computer.

Mr.

Craghead did not retain any duplicative or additional business
copies at a separate location.

Given this fact it would be

impossible for Mr. Craghead to produce any documents after the
burglary for all of his documents and information were held at
Mr. Padan's place of business which was burglarized.
As for the impossibility of producing certain printed
documents after the burglary, Plaintiff should understand that
the documents sought in his request for production of documents
are merely printed copies of information electronically stored on
the Defendants' computer.

The computer data having been stolen,

it became impossible for Defendants to produce hard copies of
such information.
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The burglary also prevented the Defendant's from producing
the

"architectural plans, Defendant Padan's 1992 and 1993 day

planners, bills and bids and invoices submitted by the
contractor."
not tidy.

The individuals who burglarized Padan's office were

The entire office was "turned upside down."

Not only

was all the electronic information which Mr. Padan had complied
for the Plaintiffs stolen, but everything that was left was
scattered throughout the office.

Mr. Padan was in no position to

provide the documents mentioned above after the burglary since
such papers were scattered along with all other papers and
equipment throughout the office.

Mr. Padan had to maintain an

ongoing business despite the robbery, making it impossible for
him to take a number of consecutive days away from work and
repair the office.

In short, all documents and information were

contained on the computers except for a few papers that were
scattered throughout the office amongst the rest of Mr. Padan's
papers.

The information having been stolen or lost, made it

impossible for the Defendants to make hard copies of such
documents and transfer them to the Plaintiff after the burglary.
With these facts in mind as well as additional facts set
forth in more detail in Defendants' brief, Defendants submit that
the trial court breached the boundaries of discretion as set
forth in Carmen v. Slavens, 546 P.2d 601 (Utah 1976) and at page
12 of Defendants' Brief.

Having abused the standards of

discretion, the Defendant asks this court to Vacate the trial
courts Judgment

and remand the case for trial, thereby enforcing

the policy articulated in Carman v. Slavens, 546 P.2d 601, 603
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(Utah 1976) which "resolves doubts in favor of permitting parties
to have their day in court on the merits of the controversy." Id.
III. AS A MATTER OF LAW THE TRIAL COURTfS ENTRY OF A
JUDGMENT AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS SHOULD BE
OVERTURNED FOR FAILURE TO COMPORT WITH RULE 4504(2) OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION.
The Plaintiff misstates the Defendants second issue, by
assuming that the Plaintiff is alleging a violation of Rule 4504(1).

Rather, the Defendants assert that the Plaintiff

violated Rule 4-504(2) of the Code of Judicial Administration
which requires that:
Copies of all proposed findings, judgments, and order
shall be served upon the opposing party before being
presented to the court for signature unless the court
otherwise orders. Notice of objections shall be
submitted to the court and counsel within five days
after service.
Based upon the certificate of mailing attached to the
proposed order, the proposed order was mailed to the Defendants
only two (2) days prior to the court signing the Order.

The

Defendants were not given five (5) days to respond to the
proposed order as required by Rule 4-504(2)—an order which for
the first time mentioned the twenty (20) day time limit.

Given

the time required for delivering mail from Salt Lake to Logan,
the Defendants had no notice of the twenty (20) day time limit
before the court signed the Order.
Plaintiff alleges that the Circuit Court's Minute Entry put
the Defendants on notice.

However, such is not the case.

Minute Entry was entered without a hearing.
Entry sent to the Defendants.
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The

Nor was the Minute

To allow a party to mail a proposed order to the opposing
party only two (2) days before the court rules on the order
denies the opposing party "timely and adequate notice and
opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way [which is] the very
heart of procedural fairness."

Cornish Town v. Roller, 798 P.2d

753 (Utah 1990).
IV.

AS A MATTER OF LAW TRIAL COURT'S ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
AGAINST DEFENDANTS BE OVERTURNED FOR FAILURE TO
COMPORT WITH RULE 4-504(4) OF THE UTAH CODE OF
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION.

The Plaintiff's brief fails to address the issues raised by
Defendants' brief concerning Rule 4-504(4).

The evidence in the

record unequivocally demonstrates that a signed judgment was not
transferred to the Defendants as required by Rule 4-504(4).
Defendants' Brief page 22.

See

Such a breach constitutes error by

trial court, requiring the judgment entered against the
Defendants vacate and the case be remanded for trial.

See

Defendants' brief pp. 22-23.
V.

DEFENDANTS HAVE PRESERVED THE ISSUES OF CLAIM AND
ISSUE PRECLUSION AND THEY ARE PROPERLY BEFORE THIS
COURT.

The Defendants have preserved the issues of claim and issue
preclusion through their Answer and Counterclaim.

Defendants'

Counterclaim addresses the offsets to the Plaintiff's claims.
The $11,000 which Bennett was precluded from collecting is an
offset to Plaintiffs 13,515.58 claim.

See Appendix A of the

Defendants' brief.
Moreover, the fact that the trial court in the present case
dismissed the Defendants' Answer and entered judgment for the
7

Plaintiff prior to trial (let alone any pre-trial conference)
explains why the $11,000 offset was not more specifically laid
out and presented at the trial court.

The Defendants simply were

not yet in a position to more explicitly set forth the offset
resulting from the dismissal of Mr. Bennett's claim.
However, the fact that Defendants' counsel questioned Mr.
Mower at the deposition about the money attributable to Mr.
Bennett's claim demonstrates that Defendants were pursuing such
amounts as an offset.
In fact, at the time the trial court entered the default
judgment, Defendants' counsel was in the process of drafting a
summary judgment motion precluding Plaintiff from collecting the
money owed to Bennett.
The Defendants did raise and preserve the issue of offsets
in the trial court, given the infancy of the proceedings at the
time the case was dismissed, Defendants assert that they have
sufficiently preserved the issue for appeal.
VI.

THE ISSUE WAS LITIGATED ON THE MERITS.

Plaintiff in his brief cites Rinqwood v. Foreign Auto Works,
Inc. 786 P.2d 1350, in support of the necessity of preserving
issues for appeal.

However, Plaintiff fails to cite the language

on page 1358 of the Rinqwood opinion footnote 5 which states:
The fact that the prior action was dismissed with
prejudice does not nullify res judicata application, as
such constitutes litigation on the merits. Rinqwood at
1358 citing Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 52(a);
Steiner v. State, 495 P.2d 809 (Utah 1972).
The language in the Bennett v. Craqhead order of dismissal
states:
8

For good cause appearing it is hereby: ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, and DECREED that this action is hereby
dismissed with prejudice for the reasons set forth in
this order and the Minute Entry dated March 31, 1994.
(Appendix A of Defendants' Brief.)
The basis for this dismissal with prejudice was Section 5855-17 U.C.A., which prevents unlicensed contractors from suing
for services rendered.
To allow Mr. Mower to collect the "just over $11,000" for
Mr. Bennett, when the District Court has ruled Mr. Bennett is not
entitled to collect such money violates the essence of res
judicata.

To allow Mr. Mower to collect and retain just over

$11,000 of his $13,515 claim to which he is not entitled
constitutes unjust enrichment and one of the basis for the
doctrines of claim and issue preclusion.
CONCLUSION
Given the totality of facts in record, the trial court did
abuse its discretion in dismissing Defendant's answer and denying
Defendants Motion to set aside the judgment.
The trial court erred by failing to follow the procedures
required in Sections 4-504(2) and 4-504(4) of the Utah Code of
Judicial Procedure.
And the $11,000 offset to Plaintiff's 13.515.58 claim was
properly preserved given the infancy of the trial courts
proceedings.

Since the District court entered a final judgment

on the merits of Mr. BennetT's claim which constitutes "just over
$11,000" of Mr. Padan's claim, by his own admission, Plaintiff
should be precluded from collecting that $11,000 dollars.
For the reasons set forth in Defendants' Brief and Reply,
Defendants respectfully request this Court order the Circuit
9

Court to Vacate the Default Judgment and reinstate Defendants'
Answer and Counterclaim and remand for trial on the merits,
including the $11,000 offset.

Alternatively, Defendants ask the

court to remand for trial the issue of reducing Plaintiff's
judgment by the amount attributable to Mr. Bennett's claim.

^unsel^cGr^Appellants
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